Menu Search Account

LegiStorm

Get LegiStorm App Visit Product Demo Website
» Get LegiStorm App
» Get LegiStorm Pro Free Demo

A Peace Treaty with North Korea? (CRS Report for Congress)

Premium   Purchase PDF for $24.95 (13 pages)
add to cart or subscribe for unlimited access
Release Date Revised April 19, 2018
Report Number R45169
Report Type Report
Authors Emma Chanlett-Avery; Susan V. Lawrence; Mark E. Manyin; Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Source Agency Congressional Research Service
Older Revisions
  • Premium   April 9, 2018 (13 pages, $24.95) add
Summary:

After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric between Pyongyang and Washington, in March 2018 President Donald J. Trump agreed to attend a summit in spring 2018 with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea, or ROK) issued the invitation and said that North Korea (officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) was ready to discuss giving up its nuclear weapons and missile programs. The meeting, which is to follow a scheduled April 27, 2018, summit between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jaein, would be the first ever between leaders of the two countries. If the U.S.-DPRK opening leads to further talks, the agenda might include negotiating a permanent peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula, reportedly a top priority for South Korea. 1 The 1950-1953 Korean War ended in a truce, with the U.S.-led United Nations Command, North Korea, and China signing an armistice that was intended to be temporary.2 Over the course of past negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear program, many parties have proposed that the major participants in the Korean War conclude a permanent peace treaty, which would likely require Senate ratification. As described below, during the 1990s and early 2000s, North Korea agreed on several occasions to enter into discussions over a permanent peace settlement as part of accords over the DPRK’s nuclear program, but such discussions over a peace settlement did not bear fruit. North Korea, South Korea, China, and Russia all have suggested linking a peace treaty, also referred to as a “peace regime” or “peace mechanism,” to North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Through South Korean and Chinese intermediaries, Kim Jong-un has reportedly expressed his desire to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with President Trump and linked this to the dissolution of threats against North Korea and a guarantee of the DPRK regime's security.3 In the past, North Korea has included the negotiation of a peace treaty as part of its demand for security. South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who took office in May 2017, has said a peace treaty is a key part of his approach to North Korea. In 2016, China proposed pursuing parallel negotiations toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty.4 In March 2017, China proposed, and Russia subsequently endorsed, the idea of North Korea suspending its nuclear and missile activities in exchange for the United States and South Korea suspending their large-scale joint military exercises. This, they argued, could create conditions for the dual track negotiations aimed at denuclearization of the peninsula and establishment of a “peace and security mechanism.” Concluding a peace treaty presents many challenges. First, although the other major players propose linking a peace settlement to denuclearization, North Korea’s longstanding policy has been that it will not agree to give up its nuclear weapons until the United States drops what Pyongyang calls its “hostile policy.” In theory, this could be addressed through negotiating a peace treaty. North Korea, however, may demand other concessions from the United States, such as a reduction or wholesale withdrawal of the U.S. military presence on the Peninsula, and removal of its designation as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism. Most U.S. officials are unwilling to consider any pledge to reduce the U.S. military presence, particularly given North Korea’s history of threats and provocations. Congress might also object to a terrorism delisting. Second, for decades, North Korea has signaled a preference for bilateral negotiations, likely seeing direct talks as conferring more prestige on the regime, lessening their economic dependence on China, and marginalizing South Korea. The United States has traditionally insisted that South Korea and China also participate. It is not clear whether the Trump Administration will continue this policy if U.S.-DPRK discussions advance. The issue may be rendered moot if the two Koreas agree that a peace settlement is part of the agenda of the April 27 Moon-Kim summit and any inter-Korean diplomacy that ensues. Third, on the occasions when Pyongyang has agreed to enter into discussions over peace treaty negotiations that involve China and South Korea, those talks have been unsuccessful in convincing North Korea to rein in its nuclear and missile programs. Fourth, many experts believe that the Kim Jong-un regime is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons program regardless of the inducements offered.6 Finally, many observers are skeptical that North Korea would abide by any agreement.