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Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R42789 Summary Softwood lumber imports from Canada have been of concern to Congress for many years. Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce and exercises authority over trade relations with foreign nations. Lumber production is a significant industry in many states, and U.S. lumber producers are concerned they are at an unfair competitive disadvantage in the domestic market against Canadian lumber producers because of Canada's timber pricing policies. This has resulted in four major disputes (so-called "lumber wars") between the United States and Canada since the 1980s. The last major dispute was resolved when the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) was signed. Under the agreement, Canadian softwood lumber shipped to the United States is subject to export charges and quota limitations when the price of U.S. softwood products falls below a certain level. That agreement is set to expire on October 12, 2015, although both countries are prohibited from filing for trade protections for one year after the expiration. Tension between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber trading has been persistent and may be inevitable. Both countries have extensive forest resources, but they have quite different population levels and development pressures. Vast stretches of Canada are still largely undeveloped, while relatively fewer areas in the United States (outside Alaska) remain undeveloped. These differences have led to different forest policies. For decades, U.S. lumber producers have argued that they have been injured by subsidies to their Canadian competitors in the form of lost market share and lost revenue. In the United States, the majority of the timberlands are privately owned and prices are determined by competitive bidding in an open market. In Canada, the majority of the timberlands are owned by the provincial governments and leased to private firms. The provinces administratively set the price of timber through a stumpage fee, a per unit volume fee charged for the right to harvest trees. Some assert that the stumpage fees charged by the Canadian provinces are subsidized, or priced at less than their market value. Directly comparing Canadian and U.S. lumber prices is difficult and often inconclusive, however, due to major differences in tree species, sizes, and grades; measurement systems; requirements for harvesters; environmental protection; and other factors. With the pending expiration of the agreement, the softwood lumber trade relationship between the United States and Canada may be of interest to Congress. While neither the U.S. nor the Canadian government has taken a formal position on extending or reauthorizing the SLA, the U.S. lumber industry is in favor of letting the agreement expire, due in part to unfavorable arbitration decisions under the SLA, as well as other factors. Congress may consider legislation or oversight on these issues. Contents Introduction 1 Background 2 Stakeholders in the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute 3 U.S. Softwood Lumber Consumption 4 Alleged Subsidies to Canadian Lumber Producers 5 Different Land Ownership and Management Regimes 6 Different Fee Systems 6 History of the Dispute 8 The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement 10 Canadian Provinces Covered by the SLA 12 Initiatives Funded by the 2006 SLA 13 The 2008 Softwood Lumber Act 13 Analysis of the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement 14 Protecting U.S. Lumber Producers 14 Stabilizing the Lumber Market 15 Dispute Resolution 16 Opposition to the 2006 SLA 17 Issues for Negotiation 17 Log Export Restrictions 18 Quebec Reforms 18 Issues for Congress 18 Summary and Conclusion 19 Figures Figure 1. Average Monthly Composite Prices for Framing Lumber in Current (Nominal) and 2014 Dollars 4 Figure 2. U.S. Lumber Consumption by Source 5 Figure 3. U.S. Lumber Consumption by Source Percentage 5 Figure 4. Prevailing Monthly Lumber Prices (Current Dollars) and Export Provisions Under the 2006 SLA 11 Figure 5. Canadian Provinces Covered by the SLA 13 Tables Table 1. History of the Dispute 9 Table 2. 2006 SLA Export Charges and Quota Limitations Options Based on Prevailing Monthly Price of U.S. Lumber 10 Table 3. The Annual Average and Standard Deviation for the Random Length's Framing Lumber Weekly Composite Price 15 Appendixes Appendix. What Is Softwood Lumber? 21 Contacts Author Contact Information 22 Acknowledgments 22 Introduction Softwood lumber imports from Canada have been of concern to Congress for many years. Lumber production is a significant industry in many states. Canada is an important trading partner, and the U.S. lumber producers are a powerful economic influence. This has resulted in four major disputes (so-called "lumber wars") between the United States and Canada since the 1980s, with the U.S. industry filing for various trade protection measures and both countries taking their issues to various dispute settlement venues. The last major dispute was resolved when the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) was signed. The SLA applies export charges or quota limitations on Canadian softwood lumber shipped to the United States when the price of U.S. softwood lumber products is below a specified level. In January 2012, the United States and Canada extended the SLA for two years. The SLA is now set to expire on October 12, 2015, and formal negotiations to extend the agreement have not been undertaken. Under the terms of the agreement, neither country may file claims until October 2016, which effectively provides another year for negotiations. In addition, the negotiation goals of many of the stakeholders may have shifted due to recent events. The U.S. lumber industry has identified perceived flaws in the latest arbitration decision under the SLA and favors letting the agreement expire. Tension between the United States and Canada over softwood lumber trade has been persistent. Both countries have extensive forest resources, but quite different population levels and development pressures. Vast stretches of Canada are still largely undeveloped, while fewer areas in the United States (outside Alaska) remain undeveloped. These different situations have led in part to different forest policies. In Canada, the forests are largely owned by the provincial governments, which have allocated and priced timber to encourage the development of the extensive timber reserves. In the United States, the majority of timberlands are privately owned; private markets dominate the allocation and pricing of timber, although U.S. federal and other government-owned forests are regionally important. U.S. lumber producers view the Canadian policies as more favorable for timber production, and thus as an unfair competitive advantage in supplying the U.S. lumber market, especially when the market is weak. However, since the U.S. and Canadian governments influence timber production in different ways (because of different histories, purposes, and situations), comparing the relative competitiveness of U.S. and Canadian lumber producers is difficult, at best. Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce and trade relations with foreign nations. At issue for Congress is whether it desires to see the SLA continued, amended, or abandoned upon its expiration. This report examines the status and current issues surrounding Canadian softwood lumber imports since 2006. After providing background information on what constitutes softwood lumber, the stakeholders in the dispute, and the history of the dispute, the report introduces the 2006 SLA and analyzes its impacts on the U.S. lumber industry as well as on the trade relationship between the United States and Canada. Finally, the report discusses the potential issues Congress may consider when the agreement expires in 2015. Background Softwood lumber, for purposes of this report, is lumber produced from conifer trees. The definition of the term had been an issue leading up to the signing of the 2006 agreement and is discussed more thoroughly in the Appendix. The SLA definition is based on two tariff items under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) and includes essentially all traditional softwood lumber items intended for residential construction. Because softwood lumber is primarily used for residential construction, repair, and remodeling, the demand for softwood lumber is a secondary demand, derived substantially from the demand for new or remodeled houses and other buildings. Both the U.S. and Canadian softwood lumber industries are largely driven by the U.S. housing market in general and the new construction or remodeling market specifically. In the early to mid-2000s, the U.S. and Canadian softwood lumber industries enjoyed a period of prosperity as the residential real estate market boomed. However, the softwood lumber industry began to struggle when the real estate market began to crash in 2007. For example, from 2005 to 2009 the number of new home construction starts declined by 74%. Over that same period, the use of softwood lumber in the United States decreased by 41%. Further, the number of sawmills (used to process lumber) decreased by 17%, sawmill capacity decreased by 11%, and sawmill production decreased by nearly 30%. Since 2010, the U.S. housing and softwood lumber markets have made a modest recovery. New home construction starts have increased annually. U.S. consumption of softwood lumber has increased annually since 2009, although it remains well below the rates of the early 2000s and at levels not seen since the early 1980s. As a secondary demand, softwood lumber is largely price-inelastic. This means that modest changes in construction demand cause relatively large changes in lumber prices, but the price of lumber does not affect the supply or demand of lumber, or, debatably, the price of construction. For example, wood products are arguably a relatively minor component of construction costs. While some claim that wood products represent up to 15% of construction costs, using the 2014 average framing lumber composite price of $383 per thousand board feet (MBF), framing lumber in an average (2,690-square foot) new home would cost $7,512—3% of the 2014 median price of a new home. In contrast, the price of lumber dropped significantly as a result of the housing market crash. In 2009, the price of lumber fell below $200 MBF for several months, for the first time since the 1980s (see Figure 1). Although prices have begun to rise, when adjusted for inflation, the price of lumber remains relatively low, hovering below the prices of the late 1970s in real terms. Stakeholders in the U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute In the United States, the major stakeholders in the dispute include timber producers (forest land owners), lumber producers, and lumber consumers (homebuilders and home buyers). Timber producers are included with lumber producers, since many lumber producers also own significant tracts of forest land. In Canada, the major stakeholders include the Canadian lumber producers and the provincial governments, as the timber land owners. The U.S. lumber producers support trade restrictions on Canadian imports. In contrast, U.S. lumber consumers prefer access to affordable lumber and therefore many generally oppose trade restrictions on Canadian imports. The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), representing the interests of U.S. lumber consumers, argues that American home buyers are the ones who eventually pay for the cost of the trade restrictions and that unrestricted trade benefits the U.S. economy on a whole. Further, they maintain that the restrictions have "reduced the incentive for U.S. producers to adopt new and innovative technology to increase production and improve efficiency of their mills so as to be internationally competitive." However, under U.S. trade remedy laws, U.S. lumber consumers do not have standing in the dispute and may only participate as an interested party. Figure 1. Average Monthly Composite Prices for Framing Lumber in Current (Nominal) and 2014 Dollars Source: Random Lengths Publications, Inc., at http://www.randomlengths.com/ on June 15, 2015. Notes: Adjusted to 2014 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. U.S. Softwood Lumber Consumption Historically, Canada has been the largest foreign supplier of softwood lumber in the United States, accounting for 95% of imports since 1965 (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). In 1965, the United States imported less than 5 billion board feet (BBF) of Canadian lumber, accounting for only 14% of U.S. consumption. However, Canadian imports rose to more than 20 BBF in 2004 and 2005, including an 80% increase from 1990. In comparison, U.S. lumber production for the domestic market (i.e., excluding U.S. lumber exports) during that same period increased by only 56%. The Canadian share of the U.S. market peaked at more than 35% in 1995-1996 and fluctuated around 33% until 2005. Since the 2006 SLA was entered into force, the Canadian share of the U.S. market has averaged 28% annually. Figure 2. U.S. Lumber Consumption by Source Sources: Congressional Research Service (CRS); James L. Howard, U.S. Timber Production, Trade, Consumption, and Price Statistics 1965– 2002, Res. Pap. FPL–RP–615 (Madison, WI: USDA Forest Service, December 2003), Table 28, p. 52 and Table 31, p. 55. Data update provided via personal correspondence. Notes: Black line indicates when the 2006 SLA was entered in force. Figure 3. U.S. Lumber Consumption by Source Percentage Sources: CRS; James L. Howard, U.S. Timber Production, Trade, Consumption, and Price Statistics 1965– 2002, Res. Pap. FPL–RP–615 (Madison, WI: USDA Forest Service, December 2003), Table 28, p. 52 and Table 31, p. 55. Data update provided through personal correspondence with USDA. Alleged Subsidies to Canadian Lumber Producers The main basis of the United States-Canada softwood lumber dispute is the allegation that Canadian lumber production is subsidized by the Canadian government. U.S. lumber producers allege that these subsidies give Canadian lumber producers an unfair advantage in the U.S. market, causing injury to U.S. producers. The U.S. Lumber Coalition, which represents the U.S. lumber industry, has argued that absent a trade agreement or other trade protection measures, Canadian imports have risen due to government programs in Canada. In particular, they assert that the fees set by the provinces for government-owned timber are less than prices in a competitive free market in North America would be. However, comparing the relative competitiveness of U.S. and Canadian lumber producers is difficult, at best. This is due to differences in land ownership and thus timber supply, pricing and allocation systems, and measurement systems, among other factors, as described below. Different Land Ownership and Management Regimes The United States and Canada both have vast forest resources, but the ownership patterns, development pressures, and forest management policies in each country are very different. In Canada, about 92% of the timberlands are "crown lands" owned and administered by the federal and provincial governments. Overall, the provinces own 90% of the timberlands, the Canadian federal government owns 2%, and 6% is in private ownership, although the provincial ownership percentage varies by province. Most of the federally owned timberlands are northern boreal forests located in the Yukon, Nunavut, and Northwest Territories that do not produce significant amounts of softwood lumber. This contrasts with U.S. timberlands, where 44% are owned by the government (33% federal, 9% state, and <1% local) and 56% are privately owned. As a result, the United States lumber industry relies more heavily on private timber sources and the Canadian lumber industry relies mostly on public sources of timber. Each Canadian province has its own forestry laws, regulations, and standards. In general, the provinces require management plans for forested areas, typically prepared by certified professional foresters and subject to participation or review by a broad spectrum of users and interests. The provinces also allocate timber harvest. The provinces typically use tenure agreements, or leases, which grant exclusive rights to the specific annual harvest level with various management obligations (e.g., road construction and reforestation). The tenure agreements may be long-term (5-25 years) or short-term (as brief as 6 months, with fewer management obligations). Many provinces also have other agreements for selling various types of timber to specific, often quite small or family-operated firms. Different Fee Systems In large part due to the different land management regimes in the different countries, the United States and Canada each rely on different price allocation systems to determine the cost of lumber. In the United States, prices are established in competitive markets between willing buyers and willing sellers, often through auctions. This is the situation for wood product manufacturers and private timberland owners and arguably, federal timber sales in areas with competitive bidding. Thus, much of the timber from lands in the United States is probably sold at fair market values. This may not be the case in Canada, where leases (rather than competitive bids) are used to allocate timber. In Canada, the provinces charge fees for timberland leases and timber harvests. There is generally a flat annual fee for maintaining the leases, and a stumpage fee—a per unit of volume fee charged for the right to harvest the trees—for the timber harvested. In many of the provinces, stumpage fees are determined administratively, and range from a fixed, province-wide fee to fees established separately for each tenure agreement. These fees are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in the market prices of lumber and other wood products. Since the SLA went into force, at least one province has modified its stumpage pricing systems. In 2013, Quebec passed the Sustainable Forest Development Act, which, among other provisions, established that 25% of the annual allowable crown harvest will be sold at auction starting in 2013. The price received at auction is then factored into the timber agreements covering the remaining 75% of the harvest. The stumpage fees administrated by the Canadian provinces may not match market-determined prices, because the fees are determined by agency personnel who some argue have an incentive to set the fees below market value to assure the competitiveness of their products. The U.S. lumber industry asserts that the provinces have intentionally set the fees substantially below market prices, to assure the competitiveness of the Canadian producers. Whether provincial administrative stumpage fees approximate market values or are substantially below market values can only be determined by examining provincial fees and U.S. prices for comparable timber, but such comparisons are difficult, as discussed below. Comparing U.S. and Canadian Stumpage Fees Allegations that Canadian lumber production is subsidized by the Canadian government rest in part on the claims that Canadian stumpage prices—which are set administratively—are lower than the market-determined stumpage prices in the United States. This results in a lower cost of production for Canadian firms compared to U.S. firms, and is believed by many to be a subsidy from the Canadian government. However, evidence to demonstrate the possible disparity between U.S. and Canadian stumpage fees is widespread, but inconclusive. Some reports have found significantly higher stumpage fees in Canada, while other reports have found the United States to have higher stumpage fees. Also, throughout the history of the dispute, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the U.S. International Trade Administration (ITA) have found significant differences in stumpage fees in various examinations dating back to 1982. However, other analyses have shown little or no difference between U.S. and Canadian fees. Several factors can explain such apparent contradictions. First, U.S. timber and Canadian timber are measured differently. In the United States, trees and lumber are measured in board feet (linear), as described above. In Canada, trees and lumber are measured in cubic meters (volume). The conversion—how many board feet of lumber can be produced from a cubic meter of logs—depends on the diameter of the log, ranging from about 130 board feet per cubic meter for a 6-inch diameter, 16-foot log to more than 275 board feet per cubic meter for a 44-inch, 16-foot log. Thus, the conversion rate chosen (i.e., different assumptions about log diameters) can have a significant effect on the resulting price. Second, except for the occasional forest plantation, forests are not uniform monocultures—forests may contain several species of trees, each of which varies in diameter, height, and quality. U.S. and Canadian forests differ in their species mix (percentage of trees or timber volume in each species) as well as in the size and quality of the trees of each species. Comparisons typically use a single dominant species (e.g., douglas-fir), but the stumpage fee for the dominant species can be affected by the fee for other species. In U.S. federal timber sales, for example, competitive bidding is generally limited to the dominant species, with the other species being sold at the appraised price; this leads to an overall balance, but limits the validity of the fees for comparing the prices of timber in different areas. Adjusting for these differences is difficult, under the best of circumstances. Other factors also affect stumpage fees. For example, management responsibilities imposed on timber purchasers differ. In Canada, licensees are generally responsible for reforestation and for some forest protection. In U.S. federal forests, timber purchasers generally make deposits to pay for agency reforestation efforts, and some of those deposits are typically reported as part of the stumpage fees. Road construction and road maintenance responsibilities and labor compensation also differ. History of the Dispute The dispute between the United States and Canada regarding softwood lumber trade dates back to the 1930s, but the so-called lumber wars began in the 1980s when the United States first considered trade protection measures. Table 1 summarizes the major periods of trade dispute and agreement from 1982 to the present. Table 1. History of the Dispute 1982-2015 Time Period Trade Status Summary 1982-1983 Trade Dispute: Lumber I The U.S. lumber industry, represented by the Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFLI; now known as the U.S. Lumber Coalition), filed a preliminary countervailing duty petition, arguing that the U.S. lumber industry had been harmed by subsidized Canadian provincial stumpage fees. However, the International Trade Administration (ITA) did not establish a countervailing duty. 1986 Trade Dispute: Lumber II The U.S. lumber industry filed a new countervailing duty petition. In contrast to 1982, the 1986 preliminary finding established a 15% ad valorem countervailing duty, pending a final determination due by December 31, 1986. A final determination was avoided with the signing of a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two countries on December 30, 1986. 1986-1991 Trade Agreement: MOU The 1986 MOU established a 15% tax on Canadian imports until the Canadian provinces raised stumpage fees. The MOU lasted six years. 1992-1995 Trade Dispute: Lumber III Canada withdrew from the MOU and the United States imposed another countervailing duty (6.51% ad valorem) shortly thereafter. The United States and Canada filed competing claims against each other in U.S. and international courts for trade violations. 1996-2001 Trade Agreement: 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement The United States and Canada signed a five-year Softwood Lumber Agreement that established a fee on imports exceeding a specified quota. 2001-2005 Trade Dispute: Lumber IV Immediately following the expiration the expiration of the 1996 agreement, the United States again imposed countervailing and antidumping orders on Canadian lumber imports (Lumber IV). Again, both countries initiated proceedings in international and U.S. courts claiming violations of various trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The lawsuits persisted until the 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement was entered in force. 2006-present Trade Agreement: 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement The United States and Canada signed a six-year Softwood Lumber Agreement that established a system of fees and quotas on Canadian imports. In 2012, the agreement was extended through October 12, 2015. Source: CRS. The 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement On April 26, 2006, the United States and Canada announced a tentative agreement to terminate antidumping and countervailing duties and related litigation. An early version of the agreement was signed on July 1, 2006, and the Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America (SLA 2006) entered into force on October 12, 2006. The SLA was set to expire in 2013 but included an option to be renewed for an additional two years. On January 23, 2012, the United States and Canada both agreed to the two-year extension. The current SLA is now set to expire on October 12, 2015. Under the agreement, the United States revoked countervailing and antidumping orders on Canadian lumber and returned about $4 billion that was collected from the duties to the importers of record. The remaining deposits (about $1 billion) were split evenly between the U.S. lumber industry and jointly agreed-upon initiatives (see below, "Initiatives Funded by the 2006 SLA"). In exchange, the parties agreed to terminate, or in some cases dismiss, all North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization (WTO), and domestic court claims filed by Canada, Canadian producers, the United States, and the U.S. industry as represented by the CFLI (now known as the U.S. Lumber Coalition). The SLA precludes new cases, investigations and petitions, and actions to circumvent the commitments in the agreement. The SLA also included an agreement where the participating U.S. producers would not file new antidumping or countervailing duties petitions or investigations for a period of 12 months after the termination or expiration of the agreement. Table 2. 2006 SLA Export Charges and Quota Limitations Options Based on Prevailing Monthly Price of U.S. Lumber Prevailing Monthly Price per thousand board feet (MBF) Option A—Export Charge (Expressed as a % of Export Price) Option B—Export Charge (Expressed as a % of Export Price) with Volume Restraint Participating Regions British Columbia Coastal, British Columbia Interior, Alberta Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec Over $355 No Export Charge No Export Charge and no volume restraint $336-355 5% 2.5% Export Charge plus regional share of 34% of U.S. Consumption $316-335 10% 3% Export Charge plus regional share of 32% of U.S. Consumption $315 or under 15% 5% Export Charge plus regional share of 30% of U.S. Consumption Source: "Article VII, Export Charge and Export charge plus volume restraint," Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada (Washington, DC: October 12, 2006), at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3254. The SLA established export charges on Canadian softwood lumber when the Random Lengths' Framing Lumber and Composite Price falls below $355 per thousand board feet (MBF), with the rate charged varying with how far the composite price falls. The export charges can be significantly reduced if the Canadian producing region also agrees to volume restraints, which become increasingly restrictive as the average price falls (see Table 2). During the first six years the SLA was in effect, lumber prices largely remained below $315 MBF (see Figure 4) and only exceeded the trigger briefly for three months in 2010. However, for just over two years, from January 2013 through March 2015, lumber prices exceeded $355 MBF every month except one (August 2013), meaning that no export measures were applied during those months. Lumber prices began to fall in each successive month starting in March 2015. Export measures were applied in April 2015 and continue through August 2015, although the August 2015 price is an increase over previous months ($347 MBF). Figure 4. Prevailing Monthly Lumber Prices (Current Dollars) and Export Provisions Under the 2006 SLA Sources: CRS. Prevailing month price data from published reports on the Government of Canada's Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development website, http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/prod/index.aspx. Notes: The prevailing monthly price is calculated as the most recent 4-week average of the weekly framing lumber composite price, available 21 days before the beginning of the month that the prevailing monthly price shall be applied. There are several additional provisions relating to export charges and volumes. There is a third country trigger, allowing export charge refunds if, for consecutive quarters, the third country share of U.S. lumber consumption grows, the U.S. share increases, and the Canadian share decreases. A surge mechanism generally provides for substantially greater export charges if a Canadian region's exports exceed 100% of its allocated share of total Canadian exports. For high-value products—those valued at more than $500 per MBF—the export charges are calculated as if they were priced at $500 per MBF. The SLA also establishes a third party arbitration system to handle any disputes under the agreement, discussed below. In Article XV, the SLA sets forth information collection and exchange requirements that both the United States and Canada submit monthly reports aggregated to the Canadian regional level, along with quarterly data reconciliation requirements. These reports are to be publicly available. Canadian Provinces Covered by the SLA The SLA applies export measures to lumber products from timber harvested in the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia Coastal, British Columbia Interior, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Saskatchewan (See Figure 5). The export measures do not apply to lumber products from timber harvested in the Yukon, Northwest, or Nunavut Territories. Lumber produced in the Atlantic Provinces, as well as lumber certified as originating in the State of Maine, is also exempt. In addition, 32 companies—so-called border mills primarily from Quebec but also Ontario—are named in the SLA as also being exempt, subject to certain quota limitations. At the time of negotiation, there were significant private timber land holdings in these provinces, so they were not seen as benefiting from a subsidy. Figure 5. Canadian Provinces Covered by the SLA Source: Map created by CRS using Esri Basemaps. British Columbia Forest Region boundary files were created by Data BC, a pilot project of the British Columbian government, current as of 1/13/2005: https://apps.gov.bc.ca/pub/geometadata/metadataDetail.do?recordUID=32891&recordSet=ISO19115. Forest cover boundaries provided by the World Wildlife Fund Terrestrial Ecoregions data, current as of 2005. Initiatives Funded by the 2006 SLA Prior to the enactment of the 2006 SLA, the United States collected approximately $5.3 billion under the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on Canadian softwood lumber imports. As part of the SLA, the United States returned $4 billion to the importers of record. The remaining deposits were split evenly among the U.S. lumber industry, a binational panel to advance softwood lumber, and three types of initiatives in the United States. The initiatives were to provide (1) promotion of sustainable forest management practices; (2) assistance for timber reliant communities; and (3) low income housing and disaster relief. The recipients of the initiative funds include $200 million for the United States Endowment for Forestry and Communities; $150 million for the American