LegiStorm

Summary:

When exercising its power to review t he constitutionality of governmental action , the Supreme Court has relied on certain “methods” or “modes” of interpretation — that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of a provision within the Constitution. This report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation; discusses examples of Supreme Co urt decisions that demonstrate the application of these methods; and provides a general overview of the various arguments in support of, and in opposition to, the use of such methods of constitutional interpretation . Textualism. Textualism is a mode of int erpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear. Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text . Original Meaning. Whereas textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus solely on the text of the document, originalist approaches consider the meaning of the Constitution as understood by at least some segment of the populace at the time of the Founding . Originalists generally agree that the Constitution’s text had an “objectively identifiable” or public meaning at the time of the Founding that has not changed over time, and the task of judges and Justices (and other responsible interprete rs) is to construct this original meaning . Judicial Precedent. The most commonly cited source of constitutional meaning is the Supreme Court’s prior decisions on questions of constitutional law. For most, if not all Justices, judicial precedent provides po ssible principles, rules, or standards to govern judicial decisions in future cases with arguably similar facts. Pragmatism. Pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable practical consequences of one interpretation of th e Constitution against other interpretations. One flavor of pragmatism weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. Under another t ype of pragmatist approach, a court might consider the extent to which the judiciary could play a constructive role in deciding a question of constitutional law . Moral Reasoning. This approach argues that certain moral concepts or ideals underlie some term s in the text of the Constitution (e.g., “equal pro tection” or “due process of law” ) , and that these concepts should inform judges ’ interpretations of the Constitution. N ational I dentity (or “ E thos ”) . J udicial reasoning occasionally relies on t he concept of a “national ethos, ” which draws upon the distinct character and values of the American national identity and the nation’s institutions in order to elaborate on the Constitution’s meaning . Structuralism. Another mode of constitutional interpretation draw s inferences from the design of the Constitution: the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers); the relationship between the federal and state governments (known as federalism); and the relatio nship between the government and the people. Historical Practices . Prior decisions of the political branches, particularly their l ong - establ ished, historical practices , are an important source of constitutional meaning . C ourts have viewed historical practice s as a source of the Constitution’s meaning in cases involving questions about the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights, particularly when the text provides no clear answer .