Security of Air Cargo Shipments, Operations, and Facilities (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Jan. 24, 2018 |
| Report Number |
R45082 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Elias, Bartholomew |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats:
the in-flight detonation of explosives concealed in an air cargo shipment and the hijacking of a
large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population
center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. Additionally, there is concern
that chemical, biological, or radiological agents or devices that could be used in a mass-casualty
attack in the United States might be smuggled as international air cargo.
The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound
all-cargo aircraft overseas prompted policy debate over air cargo security measures and spurred
debate regarding targeted risk-based screening versus comprehensive 100% screening of all air
cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. In coordination with industry,
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
have been pilot testing a risk-based approach to vet air cargo shipments known as the Air Cargo
Advance Screening (ACAS) system, with a particular emphasis on improving scrutiny of
overseas shipments. In the 115th Congress, the Department of Homeland Security Authorization
Act (H.R. 2825), as well as the Air Cargo Security Improvement Act of 2017 (H.R. 4176), would
require the full deployment of ACAS for inbound international air cargo.
With respect to protecting passenger airliners from explosives placed in cargo, policy debate
focused on whether risk-based targeting strategies and methods such as ACAS should be used to
identify shipments requiring additional scrutiny or whether all or most shipments should be
subject to more intensive physical screening. While the air cargo industry and TSA argued for
risk-based approaches, Congress mandated 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger
aircraft using approved methods in 2007. To meet this requirement, TSA established a voluntary
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) that allows TSA-approved cargo screening, carried
out by industry personnel, to take place at off-airport manufacturing sites, warehouses,
distribution centers, and freight transfer facilities. This off-airport screening is coupled with strict
chain-of-custody measures designed to maintain the integrity of screened cargo.
To increase flexibility under CCSP, there has been recent interest in expanding the role of canine
explosives detection teams to screen air cargo, and industry has advocated for the use of thirdparty
canine teams, particularly at off-airport air cargo screening facilities. H.R. 2825 would
direct TSA to develop standards for third-party canine explosives screening for air cargo.
A number of other policies under consideration in Congress include
cooperative efforts with international partners and industry stakeholders;
the implementation challenges and effectiveness of risk-based targeting
approaches like ACAS;
TSA oversight of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP);
the feasibility and challenges of using third-party canine teams for explosives
screening; and
the costs and benefits of requiring blast-resistant cargo containers to protect
aircraft from in-flight explosions in cargo holds.
