Compulsory DNA Collection: A Fourth Amendment Analysis (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised June 22, 2010 |
| Report Number |
R40077 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Anna C. Henning, Legislative Attorney |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Relying on different legal standards, courts have historically upheld laws authorizing law enforcement's compulsory collection of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, prior cases reviewed the extraction of DNA samples from people who had been convicted on criminal charges. New state and federal laws authorize the collection of such samples from people who have been arrested or detained but not convicted. On the federal level, the U.S. Department of Justice implemented this expanded authority with a final rule that took effect January 9, 2009. The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010 (H.R. 4614), a bill passed by the House, would provide grant funding bonuses to states that authorized the collection of DNA from persons arrested for specified types of crimes.
To date, only a few courts have reviewed the constitutionality of pre-conviction DNA collection pursuant to the new federal rule. The two federal district courts to have considered the issue applied the same Fourth Amendment testâthe "general balancing" or "general reasonableness" testâbut reached opposite conclusions. In United States v. Pool, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the government's interest in collecting a DNA sample from a person facing charges outweighed any intrusion of privacy. In United States v. Mitchell, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite conclusion.
Points of disagreement between the two district court opinions are likely to reemerge as themes in future decisions addressing pre-conviction DNA collection. One difference is whether the defendant's status as a person facing criminal charges was viewed as impacting the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Another is the extent to which the government was seen as having a legitimate interest in obtaining a DNA sample in particular, rather than a fingerprint or another identifier. Finally, the courts disagreed regarding the degree of the privacy intrusion caused by collecting a DNA sample. The latter questions are framed by a larger debate about the nature and role of DNA in law enforcement. For example, is a DNA sample merely a means by which to identify a person, like a fingerprint? Or does it present a greater privacy intrusion?
A few additional factors might complicate courts' analyses of DNA collection in future cases. For example, emerging scientific research suggests that the type of DNA used in forensic analysis might implicate a greater privacy intrusion than courts had previously assumed. In addition, most courts have yet to review the constitutionality of storing convicts' DNA profiles beyond the time of sentence completion.
