India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Nov. 24, 1998 |
| Report Number |
98-570 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard P. Cronin, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a total of five underground nuclear tests, breaking a
24-year self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. Pakistan followed claiming 5 tests on May 28,
1998, and an additional test on May 30. The Indian tests, which appear to have completely
surprised the U.S. intelligence and policy community set off a world-wide storm of criticism.
President Clinton announced, on May 13, 1998, that he was imposing economic and military
sanctions mandated by Sec. 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA.) The Administration
applied the same sanctions to Pakistan on May 30.
Although the Indian government claimed concern about the "deteriorating security [and]
nuclear
environment," as its reason for testing, many observers believe that domestic political factors may
have been responsible for at least the timing of the tests. The current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government is a weak coalition of 13 disparate parties, in power only since late March, 1998. Many
analysts judged that, by conducting nuclear tests, the BJP hoped to consolidate its power by rallying
strong national pro-nuclear sentiment.
The claimed size and type of weapons tested by India may hold significant implications for its
future intentions as well as for future actions of Pakistan and China. Many experts judge that the
five Indian tests are unlikely to satisfy technical requirements for weapon development, while others
think that India may have gathered enough data to preclude the necessity for further testing.
Pakistan's tests of apparently simple fission devices appear more aimed at demonstrating the
possession of a capability based on a weapon design that it reportedly acquired from China a decade
or more ago. Both countries' nuclear tests appear to further complicate prospects for ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate.
The U.S. response to the nuclear tests thus far has centered on the imposition of mandatory
sanctions under the AECA and other legislation. Specific sanctions include: termination of U.S.
development assistance; termination of U.S. Government sales of defense articles and services;
termination of foreign military financing; denial of credit, credit guarantees, or other financial
assistance by the U.S. Government; opposition to loans or assistance by international financial
institutions; prohibition on U.S. bank loans or credit to Indian and Pakistan; and prohibition on
exports of "specific goods and technology."
U.S. options are limited by the evident determination of India and Pakistan to preserve and
develop nuclear weapons capabilities. Policy options include: maintaining or broadening sanctions;
providing the President with authority to waive current sanctions, in return for specific actions of
restraint by India and Pakistan; and providing momentum to the nonproliferation process by
concentrating on getting Pakistan to sign the CTBT first. The latter two approaches require
legislation. P.L. 105-94 , signed into law on July 14, 1998, exempts for one year AECA restrictions
on financing for food and agricultural exports. In November, President Clinton eased some
economic sanctions using one-year waiver authority given him by the Congress in October under the
Omnibus Appropriations Act.
