Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Sept. 1, 1998 |
| Report Number |
97-475 |
| Authors |
Steven R. Bowman, Julie Kim, and Steven Woehrel, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
In December 1995, a NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) was deployed to Bosnia to enforce
the military aspects of the Bosnian peace agreement. President Clinton said the deployment would
last "about one year." IFOR successfully completed its main military tasks, but implementation of
the civilian aspects of the accord, for which IFOR did not have direct responsibility, was at best a
mixed success. Faced with the possible collapse of the peace agreement if IFOR pulled out, on
November 15, 1996, President Clinton pledged to keep U.S. troops in Bosnia as part of a NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR) until June 1998. A similar state of affairs a little over a year later led
the President to announce on December 18, 1997 that he had agreed in principle that U.S. forces
should participate in a Bosnia peacekeeping force after the mandate of the current SFOR expired in
June 1998.
In a March 1998 certification to Congress, the President proposed that SFOR not be assigned
a fixed end-date, but asserted that the deployment will not be open-ended. He outlined ten
conditions to be met in Bosnia in order for the NATO-led force to be withdrawn: continuation of the
cease-fire; a restructured, re-trained and re-integrated police; effective judicial reform; dissolution
of illegal pre-Dayton institutions; democratically regulated media and access to independent media;
free and democratic elections with implemented results; free-market reforms, with an economic
program worked out with the International Monetary Fund; phased and orderly minority refugee
returns; a functioning multi-ethnic administration in Brcko; and full cooperation by the parties with
the war crimes tribunal.
The composition of SFOR has varied little since the renewal of its mandate in June 1998 as
Operation Joint Forge . As of July 1998, it comprises forces from 34 countries, totaling
approximately 35,000 troops. The U.S. contingent in Bosnia remains at about 8,300, but by October
1998 it will be reduced to 6,900. One notable change in the SFOR force structure has been the
addition of a 600-man Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) to deal with outbreaks of civil
violence. SFOR's main mission remains enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton peace accords,
but over the last year NATO has become increasingly willing to devote resources to supporting key
civil implementation tasks.
After fierce debate, the House and Senate passed separate resolutions in December 1995
expressing support for the U.S. troops in Bosnia, although not necessarily for the mission itself.
Legislative efforts to bar funds for the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia were narrowly rejected.
In the 105th Congress, similar efforts to bar a U.S. deployment after June 1998 were also rejected,
although the FY 1998 defense authorization and appropriations laws contain reporting requirements
that must be fulfilled before an extended deployment may take place. During its debate on the FY
1999 defense authorization and appropriations bills, the Senate rejected attempts to force a gradual
reduction in U.S. forces in Bosnia, but approved a sense-of-the-Senate amendment that called for
the withdrawal of U.S. forces "within a reasonable period of time."
