Summary:Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have invoked the specter of a "hollow force" to
describe what could happen to the U.S. Armed Forces if significant cuts to the defense budget are
enacted. While some Members and staff might be familiar with the "hollow force" and its causes,
newer Members and staff might not have a similar understanding of the conditions that led to the
"hollow force" and what actions were taken to improve the condition of the U.S. Armed Forces.
After several years of rapid growth in defense budgets, measures to reduce federal budget deficits
have led to projections of a substantial decline in military spending over the next decade. As a
result of limits on discretionary spending in the Budget Control Act of 2011, DOD is considering
how to absorb a reduction of $450 billion to $500 billion in planned programs through FY2021.
Senior defense officials have said that such reductions can be managed, but they also warn that
that trade-offs among defense programs will require a reassessment of priorities, and that deeper
cuts would weaken critical capabilities. A common theme is that, unless reductions are managed
prudently, budget cuts of the magnitude required, let alone larger cuts, would risk creating a
"hollow force." The term "hollow force" refers to military forces that appear mission-ready but,
upon examination, suffer from shortages of personnel and equipment, and from deficiencies in
training.
Historically, there were two periods-post-Vietnam and again in the 1990s-when the term
"hollow force" was used to describe the U.S. Armed Forces. In the case of post-Vietnam, a
variety of socioeconomic factors as well as funding decisions played a large role in the overall
decline in readiness, particularly the decision to develop new weapon systems rather than funding
other requirements. The 1990s hollow force, however, did not suffer from the socioeconomic
problems that characterized the post-Vietnam force. Instead, the military of the early and mid-
1990s was being deployed on a frequent basis for a variety of contingency operations and was
viewed by some as being "overcommitted" relative to its size and resources. This
overcommitment was further exacerbated by recruiting and retention concerns and a lack of funds
to finance new weapon systems due to DOD decisions to emphasize readiness-related funding.
A number of current defense officials have warned about the return to a "hollow force" if the
DOD budget is cut significantly. Other senior officers instead suggest that in the aftermath of two
wars, a reduction in the defense budget and the force is not unprecedented and the services will be
able to make the necessary adjustments to ensure readiness. Therefore, the question arises if it is
fair to suggest that the military could become a hollow force if DOD funding was drastically
reduced and if force structure and weapon systems programs were cut. Some believe this is a
mischaracterization, as it is considered unlikely the quality of the force will decline, that pay and
benefits will be cut to the point that service in the military becomes unattractive, and public
support for the military will erode-all factors that lead to General Meyer's description of the
post-Vietnam Army as a "hollow force." It is also noted that DOD has a great deal of discretion
on how its funds are spent and how units are organized, manned, equipped, and trained, which is
also a factor that contributes to readiness of the force.
As Congress will play a major role in shaping the Armed Forces both in terms of size,
capabilities, and how it is equipped and trained, a nuanced understanding of how the military
once became "hollow" could provide a useful context for current and anticipated legislative
action.
