Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised May 27, 2003 |
| Report Number |
RL31292 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
For well over a decade international terrorism has been a major concern of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Collection assets of all kinds have long been focused on Al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups. Intensive analytical expertise has been devoted to determining such groups' memberships,
locations, and plans. Intelligence agencies had been acutely aware of the danger for years. In
February 2001, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet publicly testified to Congress
that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving." Furthermore, "[Osama]
bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and
serious threat."
Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community gave no specific warning of the September 11, 2001
attacks. Although all observers grant that terrorist groups are very difficult targets and that
undetected movements of small numbers of their members in an open society cannot realistically be
prevented, serious questions remain. An extensive investigation by the two intelligence committees
of the September 11 attacks was undertaken in 2002. Although the final report is not yet public, the
committee members found that the Intelligence Community, prior to 9/11, was neither well
organized nor equipped to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within
the U.S. A separate independent commission was established in early 2003 to take another look at
the events preceding September 11.
Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use of agents to
acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry out covert actions). Humint is one of
the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult and is undoubtedly the
most dangerous for practitioners. Mistakes can be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and
undermine important policy goals. Congress makes decisions regarding the extent to which the
importance of humint outweighs the inherent risks.
Countering terrorism requires close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
agencies; some terrorists will need to be brought to justice in courts, but others are dealt with by
military forces or covert actions. In recent years, important steps have been taken to encourage
closer cooperation between the two communities, but some believe terrorist acts may have been
facilitated by continuing poor information exchanges between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies and by blurred lines of organizational responsibility. Congress will oversee the
implementation of the evolving relationship that affects important principles of law and
administration, and may choose to modify the roles and missions of intelligence and law enforcement
agencies.
Military operations to counter terrorism are dependent on the availability of precise, real-time
intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision guided munitions. The linkage between
sensor and "shooters" will be crucial as will access to global geospatial databases. As defense
transformation progresses, Congress will also oversee the development of increased intelligence
support to military operations including, especially, counterterrorist missions.
