Japans Self-Defense Forces in Iraq: Motivations, Constraints, and Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance Cooperation (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
April 30, 2004 |
| Report Number |
RS21816 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard P. Cronin, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
The capture and subsequent release of five Japanese civilians in two different hostage-taking
situations by Islamic terrorist groups in Iraq in April 2004 underscored the high stakes for both the
Japanese government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and for the U.S.-led coalition. Except
for the small Communist and Socialist parties, Japanese political leaders across the board supported
Koizumi's adamant stance against responding to the hostage-takers' demands that Japan withdraw
its contingent of some 550 troops that were deployed to Samawah, in southern Iraq, in early 2004.
While this show of resolve by Japan has been welcomed by the Bush Administration, the longer-term
effect of the hostage-taking and the upsurge in anti-coalition violence may reinforce the views of
many in Japan, including the main opposition party, that agreeing to send Japanese troops to Iraq was
a mistake. A number of Japanese commentators and political leaders have suggested that the
government's main motive for sending troops was to strengthen U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in
the face of perceived security threats from North Korea and a rising China, not because of strong
agreement with U.S. policy in Iraq. From this perspective, Tokyo's steadfastness could have a
positive influence on other coalition governments who may now be reconsidering their
commitments, while the withdrawal of Japanese forces, as many in Japan are demanding, could
cause significant complications for the U.S. effort in Iraq and adversely affect broader U.S.-Japan
alliance relations. This report will be updated as news events warrant.
