Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised July 19, 2006 |
| Report Number |
RL33355 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Alfred Cumming, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy
(DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA,
Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement
NNSA's
counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI
policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have
questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged
the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches have been
discussed, including the following.
One approach, which DOE has initiated, merges under the control of a new DOE Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear
weapons programs, and DOE's CI office. Under an anticipated second phase, which would require
congressional approval, the new office would absorb NNSA's CI program. Proponents assert that
consolidation would improve command, control, and communication. Opponents argue that
consolidation would dilute the focus on counterintelligence at DOE's weapons labs.
Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the
control of the NNSA administrator. Proponents argue that a semi-autonomous agency such as
NNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able to implement CI measures than is DOE.
Opponents contend that such a consolidation would undermine the effectiveness of a
counterintelligence program, which they argue requires a consolidated DOE-wide program that
includes NNSA and is under the direct control and supervision of the Energy Secretary.
Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a
new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. Proponents
argue that such an approach would not eliminate the current bifurcated structure -- a preferred
outcome -- but would enhance overall communication and coordination between the two existing
programs. Opponents counter that only way to resolve coordination and communication problems
is to consolidate the two CI programs within DOE.
A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence
programs. Proponents suggest that such an approach would clarify the chain of command.
Opponents assert that separation could further undermine coordination and communication.
A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the current
structure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention at the weapons labs.
Opponents counter that dual offices are inefficient and ultimately ineffective. This report will be
updated as warranted.
