Committee Controls of Agency Decisions (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Nov. 16, 2005 |
| Report Number |
RL33151 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Louis Fisher, Government and Finance Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Congress has a long history of subjecting certain types of executive agency decisions to
committee
control, either by committees or subcommittees. Especially with the beginning of World War II, the
executive branch agreed to committee controls as an accommodation that allowed Congress to
delegate authority and funds broadly while using committees to monitor the use of that discretionary
authority. These committee-agency arrangements took the form of different procedures: simply
notifying the committee, obtaining committee approval, "coming into agreement" understandings,
and using the congressional distinction between authorization and appropriation to exercise
committee controls.
By the 1930s, the White House and the Justice Department began to object to
committee-approval arrangements as an encroachment into executive duties and a violation of
separation of powers. Litigation in the 1970s, supported by the Administration, resulted in the
Supreme Court's decision INS v. Chadha (1983), striking down every form
of legislative veto:
two-house, one-house, committee, subcommittee, and chairman. The Court ruled that whenever
Congress intends to exercise control over any action outside the legislative branch, it must comply
with the regular constitutional requirements for lawmaking: action by both houses (bicameralism)
and submission of a bill or joint resolution to the President for his signature or veto (Presentation
Clause).
Notwithstanding this decision, agencies continue to fashion accommodations that settle some
decisions at the level of committees and subcommittees. This type of arrangement is seen frequently
in reprogramming procedures, where agencies seek committee/subcommittee approval before
shifting certain types of funds within an appropriations account. A number of committee vetoes are
also used outside the reprogramming process.
This report explains how and why committee vetoes originated, the constitutional objections
raised by the executive branch, the Court's decision in Chadha , and the continuation of
committee
review procedures since that time. For a brief six-page treatment, see CRS Report RS22132(pdf) ,
Legislative Vetoes After Chadha , by Louis Fisher. This report will be updated as events
warrant.
