Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Jan. 24, 2006 |
| Report Number |
RL33095 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
The issue that has received the most attention in post-Katrina discussions is the speed of rescue and relief operations. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) Northern Command began its alert and coordination procedures before Katrina's landfall; however, many deployments did not reach the affected area until days later. An examination of the timeline of DOD's response and the decision points along that timeline could provide insight into whether the response could have been accelerated given the intensity of the storm and the extent of the destruction. Both the National Response Plan and DOD's own Homeland Security Doctrine lay out extensive procedures and specific decision points in an attempt to ensure an organized response to catastrophic incidents. It may now be necessary to examine those procedures and the actions of responsible authorities to determine whether procedural obstacles, administrative failures, or both delayed the arrival of needed resources in the affected area. The traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource only of last resort may also require reexamination.
As with most natural disasters, the role of the National Guard is critical in the maintenance of civil order, the provision of logistical support, and the coordination of rescue and relief effort. The National Guard's ability to respond through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact may be proven to have been exemplary, given the extent of regional destruction. Nevertheless, a number of issues may attract attention. The fact that the National Guard may act under state control or may be federalized and brought under command of active duty forces at the President's discretion creates a decision-point with political, cost, and coordination/command implications. They present a core concern in the balance of state and federal control in disaster situations.
Another issue that has attracted significant attention is the question of whether the demands of overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in any way affected the quality of response of both active duty and National Guard forces. Both DOD and the National Guard have denied any deleterious effect; however, there is some evidence that equipment shortages among National Guard units and the non-availability of some active duty units could be attributed to overseas deployment activities. The National Guard's equipment levels and deployment policies may be of particular interest, given its dual responsibilities both domestically and overseas.
In examining its roles, missions, and capabilities, it is likely that the controversies surrounding the federal response to Katrina will affect DOD's consideration of its responsibilities and its ability to execute them. Though Katrina was a natural disaster, many of its effects could be encountered in an intentional attack. Consequently, "lessons learned" from the Katrina experience may carry long-term relevance for DOD's civil support planning.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
