9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy â A Model for Congressional Oversight? (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Oct. 19, 2004 |
| Report Number |
RL32538 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Christopher M. Davis, Government and Finance Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
In its July 22, 2004, final report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (also known as the "9/11 Commission") proposed a five-part plan to build unity of effort
across the U.S. government in fighting terrorism. The commission's report includes specific
recommendations for "centralizing and strengthening congressional oversight of intelligence and
homeland security issues" including a recommendation that Congress consider creating a joint
committee for intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its model. Created in the
wake of the explosion of the first atomic weapon in the summer of 1945, the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy (JCAE 1946-1977) has been described as one of the most powerful congressional
committees in history.
Congress gave the JCAE exclusive jurisdiction over "all bills, resolutions, and other matters"
relating to civilian and military aspects of nuclear power, and made it the only permanent joint
committee in modern times to have legislative authority. The panel coupled these legislative powers
with exclusive access to the information upon which its highly secretive deliberations were based.
As overseer of the Atomic Energy Commission, the joint committee was also entitled by statute to
be kept "fully and currently informed" of all commission activities and vigorously exercised that
statutory right, demanding information and attention from the executive branch in a fashion that
arguably has no equivalent today.
This report provides an outline of the structure and history of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and raises a number of issues that might be considered by policymakers as they weigh the
suitability of the JCAE as a possible model when crafting congressional oversight mechanisms. For
example, one factor that might be weighed by policymakers is evidence that shows that the JCAE
was not created to be one of the most powerful committees in congressional history;
it evolved into
one as a result of personalities and circumstances.
On August 25, 2004, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) and Minority Leader Tom
Daschle (D-SD) announced the appointment of a working group of 22 Senators to examine how best
to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that deal with reform of the Senate's
oversight of intelligence and homeland security. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted
S.Res. 445 , as amended, which made a number of changes in the operation and
jurisdiction of Senate committees to improve oversight. The 9/11 Commission's recommendation
for a joint committee modeled after the JCAE was not included in S.Res. 445 .
In October, both chambers passed legislation to make changes in the structure of U.S.
intelligence agencies. While H.R. 10 , the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act,
and S. 2845 , the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, each embrace a number of
the intelligence reform recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, none included provisions
modeled after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. This report will be updated as circumstances
warrant.
