Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Feb. 11, 2005 |
| Report Number |
RL32515 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the best known member of the Intelligence
Community, the bulk of the nation's intelligence effort is undertaken by the intelligence
agencies of
the Department of Defense (DOD). In particular, the National Security Agency (NSA), the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (formerly
known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)) are major collectors of information
for DOD and non-DOD consumers and absorb a large percentage of the annual intelligence budget.
(The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), albeit a large and important component of the Intelligence
Community, is more directly focused on DOD requirements.)
Some Members of Congress and independent commissions, most recently the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission, have argued that
a lack of coordination among intelligence agencies contributed to the failure to provide warning of
the terrorist attacks of September 2001. In response, in December 2004 Congress passed intelligence
reform legislation ( P.L. 108-458 ) that modifies the existing organization of the Intelligence
Community and establishes more centralized leadership under a newly created Director of National
Intelligence (DNI).
As the legislation was being debated in the fall of 2004, attention focused on the extent of the
budgetary and administrative authorities to be assigned to the DNI. Significant concerns were
expressed by DOD officials, some Members of Congress, and various outside observers that
providing the DNI with greater authority and control of intelligence agencies in DOD could
jeopardize the increasingly close relationship between these agencies and the operating military
forces.
The conference committee on intelligence reform legislation ( S. 2845 ) addressed
these concerns with language that gave the DNI substantial authorities over intelligence budgets, but
not operational control over their activities. The final version of the legislation also provided that
the details of budgetary authorities to be exercised by the DNI and other cabinet officers be worked
out in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the President after the DNI is appointed.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
