Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised March 31, 2006 |
| Report Number |
RL32272 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Jim Nichol, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, and
security
forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forces occupied most
of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military and civilian casualties
and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin's rise to power and continuing
popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute this conflict successfully.
In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and a presidential election in March
2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to the region.
After Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, the Putin
administration appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to
establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. This pro-Moscow government has used its
own forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawal
of most Russian troops from the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with related
pacification efforts, has constituted the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to wind
down the fighting. Pacification efforts have aimed to gain the support or acquiescence of the
population to federal control and have included rebuilding assistance and elections. The
assassination of a pro-Moscow Chechen leader in May 2004, the attack on a school in the town of
Beslan, Russia, in September 2004, by Chechen terrorists, and widening of conflict to other areas
of Russia's North Caucasus have raised questions about whether Chechenization and pacification are
succeeding.
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia is that Russian troops use
excessive and indiscriminate force to quell separatism in Chechnya and commit serious human rights
abuses. Several analysts have discerned a decrease in Bush Administration criticism of Russian
policy in Chechnya, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater hostage crisis and
stepped-up terrorist bombings and armed attacks throughout Russia in recent years. U.S. concerns
before the Iraq conflict with gaining Russia's support also may have contributed to the shifts. There
appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peace talks with
"moderate" separatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it primarily was battling terrorism
in Chechnya, and some hope that elections and rebuilding in Chechnya could contribute to a
"political settlement." But some in the Administration also argue that Russia is showing declining
interest in the adoption of Western democratic and human rights "values," and that such slippage
could ultimately harm bilateral relations.
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 ) retains
a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cuts some aid to Russia unless the President
determines that Russia is not hampering access to Chechnya by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). One issue for the second Session of the 109th Congress is whether to continue this ban in
FY2007 legislation.
