Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Jan. 3, 2003 |
| Report Number |
RL30551 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Kenneth Katzman, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Successive U.S. administrations since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a
potential
threat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf and in the broader Middle East and have sought
to limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderate elements inside Iran since 1997
led the United States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and
George W. Bush Administration did not reduce U.S. efforts to deny Iran advanced conventional arms
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran's moderates appear to see regional
threats to Iran as do Iran's hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran's efforts to
acquire WMD. Even if moderate leaders had sought to do so, they have been largely
outmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal
security services, the judiciary, and key decision-making bodies.
In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated
conventional arms or independently develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and one of Iran's
objectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skills to become self-sufficient.
Iran has come a long way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and
chemical weapons, but in the aggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreign suppliers. This dependence
has given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to contain Iran's
WMD capabilities. European allies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional
weaponry to Iran, and the United States has persuaded its European allies not to sell any technology
that could have military applications ("dual use items") to Iranian military or security entities.
To try to thwart U.S. efforts, Iran has cultivated close relationships with foreign suppliers that
are not allied to the United States, especially Russia, China, and North Korea. Curtailing arms and
technology supplies to Iran has formed an important part of the U.S. agenda with all three of these
countries, but more pressing U.S. objectives with each of them have sometimes hampered the U.S.
ability to dissuade them from assisting Iran. Iran apparently continues to receive critical technology
from all three, but U.S. efforts appear to be limiting their supply relationships with Iran.
Congress and successive Administrations have enacted several laws and executive orders, many
of which are similar to each other, that impose sanctions on countries and firms that sell WMD
technology to Iran. The most recent measure enacted is the Iran Nonproliferation Act ( P.L.
106-178 ), signed in March 2000. The Clinton Administration generally preferred diplomacy and
engagement with supplier states, and it used the threat of sanctions to obtain supplier cooperation.
The Bush Administration has taken much the same approach, although it has appeared more willing
than its predecessor to sanction entities in some supplier states.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
