Presidential Rescission Authority (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Dec. 23, 2004 |
| Report Number |
RL30223 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Virginia A. McMurtry, Government and Finance Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
The Impoundment Control Act (ICA) constituted Title X of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344, 99 Stat. 297). The ICA designated two categories of impoundments: deferrals, or temporary delays in funding availability, and rescissions, or permanent cancellations of budget authority. The act stipulated different procedures for congressional review and control of the two types of impoundment actions. In the case of a rescission, the ICA provided that the funds must be made available for obligation unless both houses of Congress took action to approve the rescission request of the President within 45 days of continuous session (not counting recesses of more than three days).
As experience with the Impoundment Control Act produced growing concern with the existing framework, attention came to focus on three different approaches to granting the President greater authority over the spending of funds provided by Congress. With enhanced rescission, the burden of action was reversed, creating a presumption favoring the President. Unlike the original framework of the 1974 act, with enhanced rescission, budget authority identified in the President's message remains canceled unless Congress acts to disapprove the President's action within a prescribed period. Under expedited rescission, the intent was to ensure a vote in Congress on rescission requests by various procedural requirements. Such proposals usually contain a specific timetable along with expedited procedures to facilitate congressional review and action on rescission messages from the President. A third approach, called separate enrollment, more closely resembled a statutory item veto. With separate enrollment, an appropriations bill was broken up into many individual pieces by the enrolling clerk prior to presentation for the President's signature. So, each item of appropriation became a separate bill, giving the President de facto item veto authority.
Since 1974, repeated attempts have been made in Congress to amend the ICA or otherwise provide the President with expanded rescission or overt item veto authority. After reviewing selected floor votes of interest, using Congressional Research Service files and Library of Congress databases, this report assesses these attempts to expand the President's power. The majority of the votes examined (23 out of 36, or more than 60%) dealt with enhanced or expedited rescission proposals, while 10 votes involved separate enrollment procedures.
Impoundment reform efforts culminated in the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200). However, it was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1998. In the aftermath of that decision, there has been renewed interest in other approaches that might pass constitutional muster. Several measures have been introduced in subsequent Congresses to provide alternative statutory means for conveying expanded rescission authority to the President.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
