India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Dec. 22, 2006 |
| Report Number |
RL33292 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Sharon Squassoni, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the
creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civil nuclear cooperation between the
United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy and
practice. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinent laws
to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateral
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things,
separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, and
signing an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016 , U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With
India:
Issues for Congress , by Sharon Squassoni, for further details on the agreement.
The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on March 2, 2006,
and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power reactors under inspection, bringing
the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spent fuel
storage facilities were declared, as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as
"safeguards-irrelevant." The plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous power
reactors, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), military
production reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants. Administration
officials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible because it covers more than
just a token number of Indian facilities, provides for safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstream
and downstream facilities.
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to ensuring that the
United States complies with its Article I obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For
almost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities
in a state provides adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to back
a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of comprehensive
safeguards.
Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the Administration eventually
submits its cooperation agreement with India for approval by both chambers. P.L. 109-401 , signed
on December 18, 2006, provides waivers for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India from
relevant Atomic Energy Act provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan and
resultant safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background on
India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and military
nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States has
adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear
weapons development, production, or proliferation.
