Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004 (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Sept. 24, 2004 |
| Report Number |
RL32500 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly
emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches.
The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of the
Departments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from
within the Intelligence Community itself.
Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately
following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the position
of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Recommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to the actual
dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlying such
proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environment as well
as domestic concerns about governmental accountability.
In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more
concerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number of
recommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligence
capabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligence
capabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play"
was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination.
Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of
intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committees
focused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that included
assassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned the
viability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resulted
in much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligence
activities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced --
but by no means predominant -- leadership role for the DCI in determining community-wide budgets
and priorities.
With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, faced the United States.
Some statutory changes were made in the mid-1990s, but their results were not far-reaching. In the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War, some observers urge reconsidering
the intelligence organization. The 9/11 Commission has specifically recommended the
establishment of a National Intelligence Director to manage the national intelligence program.
Current intelligence organization issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of arguments
pro and con that were raised by earlier investigators; this recommendation has been incorporated in
a number of bills, including S. 2845 . This report will be updated as circumstances
warrant.
