Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
May 3, 2006 |
Report Number |
RL33408 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Robert D. Critchlow, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) infrastructure supports the President and
his
combatant commanders when they direct nuclear forces. This report discusses the current role of
the NCCS in light of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), examines current issues surrounding the NCCS, reviews modernization initiatives,
summarizes NCCS functions and characteristics, and reviews NCCS platforms.
Key NCCS platforms include fixed locations such as the National Military Command Center
(NMCC), the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Operations Center (GOC), and
Site-R, and mobile platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), the
E-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC).
The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of missile
launches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, and
management of geographically dispersed forces.
The Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2001 NPR proposed a "new triad" of offensive nuclear
and conventional forces, passive and active defenses, and a robust infrastructure, tied together by the
command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
planning architecture to confront the new, allegedly unpredictable post-Cold War environment.
Adapting to non-nuclear responses and active defenses poses additional challenges for the current
NCCS.
Some might question the continued relevancy of the legacy Cold War NCCS architecture. It was
designed against a "decapitation" threat from the Soviet Union. This threat might not still exist.
However, some believe China is investing in a nuclear capability to compete with the United States.
Iran
and North Korea might be developing nuclear capabilities that, if not used to strike directly at the
United
States or U.S. forces, might be used to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could wreck
U.S.
infrastructure. In addition to confronting these potential catastrophic threats, the NCCS could direct
conventional military operations, aid continuity of government in crises, and support civil authorities
during natural disasters or emergencies.
The Defense Department has proposed several modernization and procurement initiatives in
its 2007 budget. The DOD budget requests upgrades for the Minimum Essential Emergency
Communications Network (MEECN) links to the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
bombers, and tanker forces. It incorporates a redesign and consolidation of the NMCC, as part of
ongoing Pentagon renovation efforts. It proposes several communications and aircraft upgrades to
the E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP. It seeks funding for a sweeping upgrade to its satellite
communications capability through the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program and
its follow-on, the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) program.
This report will be updated as needed.