Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Nov. 14, 2003 |
| Report Number |
RL32158 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Steve Bowman, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,
1993,
in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention entered into force
April 29, 1997. One hundred fifty-three of the 178 signatories have ratified the Convention. On
April 24, 1997, the Senate passed the CWC resolution of ratification ( S.Res. 75 , 105th
Congress) by a vote of 74-26. President Clinton signed the resolution and the United States became
the 75th nation to ratify the CWC Convention, and Congress retains a continuing oversight role in
its implementation.
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by
members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and
production facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC's
deadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012.
The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control
treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Convention
also requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare
agents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation.
Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation ( P.L. 105-277 ) provides the
statutory
authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civil
penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of
chemical weapons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of
contraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirements
relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood of
being used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential business
information gathered from private corporations. The legislation also provides detailed procedures
to be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant
procedures, should they be required.
CWC advocates continue to express concerns over so-called "treaty-breaking "sections of the
implementing legislation, and lobby for their amendment. Of particular concern are provisions that
allow the President to block challenge inspections, and that prohibit the OPCW inspectors from
sending chemical samples outside the United States for analysis. These provisions are intended to
protect U.S. national security interests and proprietary commercial information. CWC supporters,
however, believe that blocking a challenge inspection violates a basic premise of the convention, and
that forcing inspectors' analysis to be conducted within the United States undermines confidence in
the verification regime. These provisions may also provide an excuse for other nations to adopt
similar positions. This report will be updated as events warrant.
