High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Sept. 9, 2003 |
| Report Number |
RL31861 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Dana A. Shea, Resources, Science, and Industry Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Terrorist use of chemical agents has been a noted concern, highlighted after the Tokyo Sarin gas
attacks of 1995. The events of September 11, 2001, increased Congressional attention towards
reducing the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. High-threat chemical agents, which
include chemical weapons and some toxic industrial chemicals, are normally organized by military
planners into four groups: nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, and blood agents. While the
relative military threat posed by the various chemical types has varied over time, use of these
chemicals against civilian targets is viewed as a low probability, high consequence event.
High-threat chemical agents, depending on the type of agent used, cause a variety of symptoms
in their victims. Some cause death by interfering with the nervous system. Some inhibit breathing
and lead to asphyxiation. Others have caustic effects on contact. As a result, chemical attack
treatment may be complicated by the need to identify at least the type of chemical used. Differences
in treatment protocols for the various high-threat agents may also strain the resources of the public
health system, especially in the case of mass casualties. Additionally, chemical agents trapped on
the body or clothes of victims may place first responders and medical professionals at risk.
Protection from and detection of chemical agents is an area of much concern. The range of
protection and detection equipment available to first responders has led to questions regarding
equipment standardization and state and local preparedness.
Whether terrorist groups are capable of using chemical agents as weapons of mass destruction
is unclear. Some have asserted that the volumes of chemicals required to cause mass casualties
would make that scenario unlikely. They claim that chemical terrorism is more likely to be small
in scale. Others have suggested that there has been an increase in terrorist interest regarding
chemical agents, and that this interest could lead to their use in terrorist attacks.
Current policies seek to reduce the proliferation of chemicals that could be transformed into
chemical weapons, prevent unrestricted access to large amounts of toxic chemicals, provide federal
assistance to locations that are affected by chemical terrorism, and support research and development
activities. It is expected that the Department of Homeland Security will take a major role in federal
policy efforts.
Additional measures suggested for addressing potential chemical terrorism vulnerabilities
include further restricting domestic access to precursor chemicals and technologies required to
manufacture high-threat chemical agents; directing continued research and development into
selective, sensitive chemical agent detectors; implementing air monitoring equipment to detect
chemical releases in, for example, public transportation or urban spaces; and overseeing further
research into protective equipment, prophylaxis, and treatment against high-threat chemicals. This
report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
