Escalation of the Israel-Iran Conflict (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Oct. 29, 2024 |
| Report Number |
IN12347 |
| Report Type |
Insight |
| Authors |
Jim Zanotti; Clayton Thomas; Jeremy M. Sharp; Christopher M. Blanchard |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
In October 2024, Iran and Israel exchanged attacks for the second time this year (see Figure 1 and Figure
2), after doing so in April. This resumption of direct conflict comes a year after Hamas (an Iranian ally)
led attacks from the Gaza Strip against Israel. Beyond Gaza and the West Bank, hostilities between Israel
and Iran-supported groups (the self-proclaimed “axis of resistance”) have flared in Lebanon, Yemen and
the Red Sea, Iraq, and Syria. U.S. forces and international vessels have also come under fire from Iraniansupported groups. While the Biden Administration has repeatedly supported Israel’s right to self-defense,
it also has sought to de-escalate tensions. Beyond the parties themselves, Israel-Iran escalation could have
wide-ranging implications for a host of issues, including energy markets, nuclear proliferation, and U.S.
global force posture. After Israel’s October 26 retaliation to Iran’s October 1 attack, a senior U.S. official
said that this round of direct Israel-Iran fire should be complete, and that U.S. forces were ready to help in
Israel’s defense if Iran responds. Lawmakers may take varying stances on possible escalation or deescalation in the Middle East and efforts to support, restrain, or oppose the operations of Israel and other
key regional actors.
