Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (CRS Report for Congress)
Release Date |
Revised Oct. 29, 2024 |
Report Number |
IF12106 |
Report Type |
In Focus |
Authors |
Paul K. Kerr |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
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Summary:
Iran’s nuclear program has generated widespread concern
that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. According to U.S.
intelligence assessments, Tehran has the capacity to
produce nuclear weapons at some point, but has halted its
nuclear weapons program and has not mastered all of the
necessary technologies for building such weapons. (For
additional information, see CRS Report RL34544, Iran’s
Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.)
Since the early 2000s, Tehran’s construction of gas
centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities has been the main
source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges enrich
uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at
high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium235 (u-235) isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both
low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear
power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which
is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear
weapons. Tehran asserts that its enrichment program is only
meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear reactors.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
requires Iran to implement various restrictions on its
nuclear program, as well as to accept specific monitoring
and reporting requirements. (For more information, see
CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s
Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K.
Kerr.)
Then-President Donald Trump announced in May 2018 that
the United States was ending U.S. participation in the
JCPOA. Over time, Iran subsequently stopped
implementing much of this agreement, as well as JCPOArequired International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
monitoring. Beginning in July 2019, the IAEA verified that
some of Iran’s nuclear activities were exceeding JCPOAmandated limits. Tehran’s subsequent expansion of the
country’s enrichment program has decreased the amount of
time needed for Iran to produce enough weapons-grade
HEU for a nuclear weapon—an action frequently termed
“breakout.”
According to official U.S. assessments, Iran halted its
nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed
it. This program’s goal, according to U.S. officials and the
IAEA, was to develop an implosion-style nuclear weapon
for Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile. Iran has not made a
decision to develop nuclear weapons, according to several
2024 public U.S. intelligence assessments.
The U.S. government assessed prior to the JCPOA that Iran
had not mastered all of the necessary technologies for
building a nuclear weapon. However, Tehran may now be
conducting work on such technologies. The 2024 U.S.
Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment
published by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) observes that “Iran is not currently
undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development
activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”
But this phrase is absent from a July 2024 ODNI
assessment of Tehran’s nuclear program.
The JCPOA-mandated restrictions on Iran’s nuclear
program, as well as the agreement’s Iran-specific
monitoring and reporting requirements, both supplement
Tehran’s obligations pursuant to the government’s
comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement. Such
agreements empower the agency to detect the diversion of
nuclear material from peaceful purposes, as well as to
detect undeclared nuclear activities and material. These
agreements also require governments to declare their entire
inventory of certain nuclear materials, as well as related
facilities. Safeguards include agency inspections and
monitoring of declared nuclear facilities.
Prior and subsequent to the JCPOA’s January 2016
implementation, IAEA and U.S. officials expressed
confidence in the ability of both the IAEA and the U.S.
intelligence community to detect an Iranian breakout
attempt using either Tehran’s IAEA-monitored facilities or
clandestine facilities. (See CRS Report R40094). More
recently, an ODNI spokesperson indicated that the U.S.
intelligence community is capable of detecting Iranian
efforts to build a nuclear weapon, the Wall Street Journal
reported on August 9, 2024.