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Libya and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress)

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Release Date Revised Oct. 25, 2024
Report Number IF11556
Report Type In Focus
Authors Christopher M. Blanchard
Source Agency Congressional Research Service
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Summary:

Over a decade after a 2011 uprising and U.S.-backed military intervention that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments, but militias, local leaders, and subnational coalitions backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The postponement of planned elections since 2021, Libyans’ continuing lack of consensus over electoral and constitutional arrangements, the potential fragility of a United Nations (UN)-backed ceasefire, and the reemergence of institutional rivalry are prolonging Libya’s instability and pose challenges for U.S. decisionmakers. Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to prevent Libya from serving as a permissive environment for transnational terrorist groups and have taken different approaches to Libya’s internal conflict and interventions by other countries. The Biden Administration has called for the holding of new elections and used U.S. influence to bolster UN-led mediation efforts to that end. The increased presence and influence in Libya of Russian officials and security actors since 2020 paired with the effects of ongoing conflict and political instability to Libya’s south appear to be motivating the Biden Administration to prioritize efforts to unify Libyan institutions, despite lingering international and Libyan concerns about the behavior, legitimacy, and intentions of key actors. An enduring Russian military presence in Libya would create complications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military planners. Russia has also reportedly used Libya as a logistical hub for operations in the Sahel and Central African Republic. The 118th Congress has appropriated funds for U.S. diplomacy and aid programs, including pursuant to the Global Fragility Act (GFA, Title V of Division J, P.L. 116- 94). Congress also provided funds in 2024 to reestablish a U.S. full-time diplomatic presence in Libya, which could enable more robust U.S. engagement.