NATO Expansion: Cost Issues (CRS Report for Congress)
Premium Purchase PDF for $24.95 (24 pages)
add to cart or
subscribe for unlimited access
Pro Premium subscribers have free access to our full library of CRS reports.
Subscribe today, or
request a demo to learn more.
| Release Date |
Feb. 26, 1998 |
| Report Number |
97-668 |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
During their December 1997 summit in Brussels, members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
(NATO) signed protocols that would add three countries -- Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
-- to the alliance; the national legislatures of the current 16 current member countries must now
approve the enlargement; one major question being considered is how much expansion might cost.
Early in 1997, the Clinton Administration sent to Congress a report detailing its rationale and
cost estimates for NATO enlargement. The report noted that, with the collapse of the Soviet threat,
NATO has reoriented itself from a static defense posture suitable during the Cold War to a more
flexible and mobile set of capabilities to respond to different types of threats. The Administration
maintains that this "new strategic concept" dovetails with the task of extending NATO membership
to new entrants through measures that will permit them to defend themselves and integrate with
NATO forces, and through enhancing the alliance's ability to project ground and air power. The
report estimated enlargement costs (between 1997 and 2009) at $27-35 billion. Of this, the U.S.
share is projected to be $1.5-2.0 billion.
Two other U.S. organizations, RAND and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), also
estimated expansion costs, but used a wider range of threat assumptions and scenarios and came up
with different results. The RAND cost estimates ranged from $10-110 billion, while CBO costs
were from $21 billion to $125 billion. Although the RAND authors present a series of increasingly
ambitious deployments, their report highlights a $42 billion, joint (air/ground) power projection
program, similar to the type of defense posture outlined by the Clinton Administration. It appears
that if the CBO had used the same reduced threat assumption for its comparable defense posture, its
estimate would have been over $60 billion. Part of the cost disparity may arise from different
perceptions of what constitutes an "adequate" defense. Also, it would appear that more micro-level
assumptions -- those regarding specific types of weapon systems and equipment necessary -- can
have a major effect on aggregate costs.
In December 1997, NATO announced that its staff had estimated the 10-year cost of
enlargement at $1.5 billion. Unlike the other studies, this one did not include the aggregate
deployment expenses of individual member countries, but focused strictly on increased costs for
NATO's common budget to fund programs for new members. The U.S. Department of Defense
reportedly has concurred with the new NATO estimate.
As they debate expansion, policymakers may encounter some longer-term issues that will affect
costs, including: the timing of expenditures associated with expansion; possible economic benefits
for the United States; the ability of Russia to rebuild its armed forces; future rounds of NATO
expansion; alliance burdensharing, and political pressures.
