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Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy (CRS Report for Congress)

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Release Date Revised Jan. 3, 2022
Report Number RL33142
Report Type Report
Authors Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Source Agency Congressional Research Service
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Summary:

Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After a uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address security issues, reshape the country's finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. Insecurity spread as local armed groups competed for influence and resources. Qadhafi compounded stabilization challenges by depriving Libyans of experience in self-government, stifling civil society, and leaving state institutions weak. Militias, local leaders, and coalitions of national figures with competing foreign patrons remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. An atmosphere of persistent lawlessness has enabled militias, criminals, and Islamist terrorist groups to operate with impunity, while recurrent conflict has endangered civilians' rights and safety. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. Key Issues and Actors in Libya. After a previous round of conflict in 2014, the country's transitional institutions fragmented. A Government of National Accord (GNA) based in the capital, Tripoli, took power under the 2015 U.N.-brokered Libyan Political Agreement. Leaders of the House of Representatives (HOR) that were elected in 2014 declined to endorse the GNA, and they and a rival interim government based in eastern Libya have challenged the GNA's authority with support from the Libyan National Army/Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LNA/LAAF) movement. The LNA/LAAF is a coalition of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military officer Khalifa Haftar: it conducted military operations against Islamist groups in eastern Libya from 2014 to 2019 and upended U.N. mediation efforts by launching a surprise offensive in April 2019, seeking to wrest control of Tripoli from the GNA and local militias. Fighters in western Libya rallied to blunt the LNA's advance, and inconclusive fighting has continued despite multilateral demands for a ceasefire. As of 2020, LNA forces and local partners control much of Libya's territory and key oil production and export infrastructure directly or through allies. GNA supporters and anti-LNA groups retain control of the capital and other key western areas. Foreign actors, including U.S. partners in Europe and the Middle East, have long found themselves at odds over Libya's conflict, and several countries have provided increased military assistance to warring Libyan parties since April 2019 in violation of a longstanding U.N. arms embargo. According to U.S. officials, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates arm the LNA. Conflict dynamics have shifted over time because of the presence of Russian-national private contractors among LNA forces, the conclusion of Turkey-GNA maritime and security agreements, Turkish deployments of soldiers, equipment, and Syrian mercenaries on behalf of the GNA, and expanded weapons shipments to both sides. Conflict, COVID-19, and U.S. Responses. Since April 2019, fighting has killed more than 2,200 Libyans (including hundreds of civilians) and displaced more than 149,000 people near Tripoli. U.N. officials report that nearly 345,000 people are in frontline areas. More than 650,000 foreign migrants also are present in Libya and remain vulnerable. In 2020, U.S. and U.N. officials have condemned new weapons shipments to Libya and called for a humanitarian ceasefire to allow Libyans to address the threats posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Humanitarian access is restricted and parties to the conflict have shut down national oil production. State Department officials have condemned what they regards as "toxic foreign interference" and have called for "a sovereign Libya free of foreign intervention." In March 2020, U.S. officials called on Libyans to cease fighting, bolster public finances, and prioritize support to the health system in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011, and is considering proposals to authorize additional assistance (and S. 2934).