U.S. Intelligence and Policymaking: The Iraq Experience (CRS Report for Congress)
| Release Date |
Revised Feb. 21, 2006 |
| Report Number |
RS21696 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
A continuing issue for Congress is the question of whether the U.S. Intelligence Community
failed
to provide accurate information about Iraqi capabilities to develop and use weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and whether the Bush Administration systematically misused intelligence to
garner support for launching Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 and for continuing military
operations in Iraq. The Senate Intelligence Committee submitted a report on the Intelligence
Community's performance in July 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-301 ), but a follow-on assessment of the use of
intelligence has not been prepared and has become the source of controversy that led to a rare closed
session of the Senate on November 1, 2005. This report explores in general terms the relationship
between the production of intelligence and the making of policy as reflected in the period prior to
the war against Iraq in March 2003 and the implications for Congress. This report will be updated
if circumstances warrant.
