Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
June 4, 2003 |
| Report Number |
RL31946 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Ronald O'Rourke, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs of interest to
Congress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and will be updated periodically
as new information becomes available. Three cautionary notes associated with post-conflict
"lessons-learned" reports apply to this report: Information about the Iraq war is incomplete and
imperfect, so early lessons are subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observers
should avoid "overlearning" the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derive
lessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces, possibly devaluing
U.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons or organizations offering purported
lessons of the Iraq war may have a financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.
Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration's vision for
defense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The issue is potentially
significant because implementing the Administration's vision could affect the composition of U.S.
defense spending, and because the Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to help
justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals that
could affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war may
influence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to carry out current
U.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be placed on forces that are less
dependent on access to in-theater bases.
One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war -- and potentially
one of those most significantly influenced by the war -- concerns the future size and composition of
the active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army
divisions may find support in the Iraq war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponents
of the current Army plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number of
lighter and more mobile units.
The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with precision-guided
weapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for investing in specific aircraft and
munitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce support generated by the war in Afghanistan for
increased investment in U.S. special operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerning
reserve combat divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers of
reserve forces.
The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations and timely
battlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological operations. It appears to have
confirmed the importance of preparing for urban combat. The war offered a limited real-world test
of the Patriot missile defense system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies for
reducing friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling capabilities,
and increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies.
