Section 1983 and the Spending Power: Enforcement of Federal âLawsâ (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Sept. 12, 2002 |
| Report Number |
RL31569 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
George Costello, American Law Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
In Gonzaga University v. Doe , the Supreme Court in 2002 held that a student may
not sue a
private university for damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to enforce provisions of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Section 1983, derived from the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, authorizes suits against state officials and others acting "under color" of state law for
deprivation of rights derived from the "Constitution and laws" of the United States. In 1980, in
Maine v. Thiboutot , the Court interpreted section 1983 broadly to apply to all federal
"laws," not just
civil rights laws. Since 1980, the Court has been divided over how to apply section 1983 to rights
derived from federal spending statutes that provide federal money to states on condition that states
use the money to implement federal programs and policies. The general rule, applicable until 1992,
recognized a presumption that individual rights created by spending statutes are enforceable in
section 1983 actions. The Court in Gonzaga confirmed a 1992 interpretation, based on
the
contractual nature of Congress's spending power, that imposes a clear statement rule and reverses
the presumption. Under Gonzaga , no right to sue under section 1983 is created unless
Congress does
so in clear and unambiguous terms. A statutory decision with strong constitutional underpinnings,
Gonzaga can be viewed as an important element of the Court's federalism jurisprudence.
The case
also represents a victory for Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has consistently opposed broad
applicability of section 1983, and now apparently has a majority that supports his position. The
implications for congressional drafting are clear: if Congress wishes to create rights in private
individuals and make those rights enforceable, it should do so explicitly.
