Russian National Security Policy After September 11 (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised Aug. 30, 2002 |
| Report Number |
RL31543 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Stuart D. Goldman, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
Russian President Putin appears to have made a strategic decision to shift Russian policy toward
cooperation with the United States and the West. This is a major departure from the policy that Putin
inherited from his predecessors, which saw Russia as the leader of a coalition aimed at opposing U.S.
"global domination."
Putin seized upon the events of September 11 to promote his new policy by: cooperating with
the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; softening Russian
opposition to NATO enlargement, including admission of former Soviet republics, and establishing
a new cooperative relationship with NATO; acquiescing in U.S. decisions regarding withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty, strategic nuclear force reductions, and missile defense; and closing Russia's large
military intelligence base in Cuba.
The principal reason given by Putin for the new policy is that Russia must integrate with the
West in order to reconstruct its own economy and achieve a decent living standard for its people.
Putin also acknowledges Russia's weakness and inability to act globally in opposition to the United
States. He may also have rejected as unwise, the previous policy of de facto alliance
with China
against the United States, instead seeing China as a possible long-term threat to Russia. Putin's new
policy does not seem to enjoy strong support among Russian political elites, the military and foreign
policy establishment, and the general public. Putin's overall political power and prestige, however,
may be sufficient to sustain the policy.
The Bush Administration responded positively to the new Russian policy after September 11.
The Administration, however, did not make many concessions on key issues related to arms control,
missile defense, and NATO. It has been more forthcoming on some economic issues.
The implications of Russia's pro-western policy are overwhelmingly positive for the United
States in the war on terrorism and in relations with Russia and China. Russia's strategic choice of
integration with the West reduces the danger seen by some of Russo-Chinese cooperation against
the United States. By depriving China of its erstwhile Russian partner, it may encourage China to
seek improved relations with the United States -- or risk geostrategic isolation.
Some sore points remain between Washington and Moscow in which Congress takes a strong
interest, such as Russia's continued and possibly expanded plans to construct nuclear reactors in Iran,
its support of Iraq, and its heavy-handed policy in Chechnya. There is also friction on some trade
issues.
Critics of Bush Administration policy argue that it has not been sufficiently responsive to Putin
and risks losing the new cooperativeness. Others reply that Russia has no choice but to continue its
pro-western course, in view of Russia's weakness and its self-interest in integrating with the West.
In this view, the endurance of Russia's pro-western policy ultimately may depend on Putin's success
in reviving the economy and improving Russians' well-being.
