National Missile Defense: Russia's Reaction (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Revised June 14, 2002 |
| Report Number |
RL30967 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Amy Woolf, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
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Summary:
In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment of defenses
against
long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National Missile Defense (NMD) system would have
exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Recognizing this, the Clinton
Administration sought to convince Russia to modify the terms of the Treaty. But Russia was
unwilling to accept any changes to the Treaty. It also decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD, insisting
that it would upset strategic stability and start a new arms race.
Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability" and that, without
its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms control agreements could
collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia's nuclear
deterrent and upset stability by allowing the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from
retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administration claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed
against rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officials
questioned this argument. They doubted that rogue nations would have the capability to attack U.S.
territory for some time, and they believed that the United States could expand its NMD system
easily. Furthermore, they argued that, when combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and
nuclear weapons, an NMD system would place the United States in a position of strategic
superiority.
During the Clinton Administration and first year of the Bush Administration, Russian officials
stated that, if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and deployed an NMD, Russia
would withdraw from a range of offensive arms control agreements. Furthermore, Russia could
deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs to overcome a U.S. NMD, or deploy new intermediate-range
missiles or shorter-range nuclear systems to enhance its military capabilities.
Russia has also outlined diplomatic and cooperative military initiatives as alternatives to the
deployment of a U.S. NMD. Russia has proposed that the international community negotiate a
Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation regime as a means to discourage nations
from acquiring ballistic missiles. It has also suggested that it would cooperate with nations in
Europe to develop and deploy defenses against theater-range ballistic missiles. Many analysts
believe this proposal was designed to win support among U.S. allies for Russia's opposition to the
U.S. NMD program. U.S. officials expressed an interest in the idea but said it could not substitute
for defenses against longer-range missiles.
The Clinton Administration sought to address Russia's concerns by offering continued support
to the fundamental principles of the ABM Treaty and by seeking to convince Russia that the U.S.
NMD system would remain too limited to threaten Russia's nuclear deterrent. The Bush
Administration, in contrast, has supported more robust missile defenses, but it also has stated that
they will not be directed against Russia's offensive forces. The President has indicated that the
United States will need to move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty, but he suggested that Russia
join the United States in developing a new strategic framework.
