Russian Fighter Aircraft Industrial Base: Parallels with the United States? (CRS Report for Congress)
Premium Purchase PDF for $24.95 (18 pages)
add to cart or
subscribe for unlimited access
Pro Premium subscribers have free access to our full library of CRS reports.
Subscribe today, or
request a demo to learn more.
| Release Date |
Revised April 9, 2002 |
| Report Number |
RL30730 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Christopher Bolkcom and Ellen Schwarzler, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
| Older Revisions |
-
Premium Nov. 8, 2000 (21 pages, $24.95)
add
|
Summary:
There are many differences between the fighter aircraft industry in the United States and in
Russia.
The United States has traditionally produced its weaponry within a capitalist framework which
allowed free enterprise and competition between companies in private industry. The former Soviet
Union's economy, and its fighter aircraft industry was based on a Marxist, command economy, where
the central government dictated the type and number of aircraft produced and allocated resources for
construction.
Once among the most glamorous components of the Soviet military industrial complex, the
Russian military aircraft industry has been described by some analysts as being on the verge of
collapse. Russia's civilian aircraft industry has faced similar pressures, which does not bode well for
the military aviation infrastructure. It may be difficult for fighter aircraft companies to find
employment in Russia's beleaguered civil aircraft sector.
The Russian government has attempted to reform its fighter aircraft industrial base and make
it more efficient and competitive with western industry. It has initiated several reforms aimed at
reducing the stratification and compartmentalization of industrial processes, as well as improving
access to financial resources. These reforms have had mixed success. While Russia's military
aviation infrastructure has consolidated dramatically, the overall effectiveness of these reform efforts
still remains to be seen.
Russia's remaining fighter aircraft design and manufacturing enterprises, Sukhoi and Mikoyan,
appear to be struggling to stay alive. Both companies have sought to make up for decreased
domestic demand by increasing their export of fighter aircraft and by winning contracts in the civilian
aviation sector. Success in both areas has been limited, and many analysts doubt that Russia can
support more than one fighter aircraft company for much longer. The potential for a merger between
the two companies has been discussed for some time. Each company has its own strengths and
weaknesses, and it is unclear which would survive a merger.
As Russia reforms its fighter aircraft industrial base, there appear to be many parallels between
their experience and what is happening in the United States in terms of declining domestic demand
and pressure for consolidation. By examining the events in Russia's military aviation industrial base,
especially the experience of the Sukhoi and Mikoyan aircraft design bureaus, policy makers in the
United States may gain insight into current and forthcoming domestic fighter aircraft industrial base
issues.
