Chevron Deference: A Primer (CRS Report for Congress)
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Release Date |
Revised May 18, 2023 |
Report Number |
R44954 |
Report Type |
Report |
Authors |
Brannon, Valerie C.;Cole, Jared P. |
Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Older Revisions |
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Summary:
When Congress delegates regulatory functions to an administrative agency, that agency’s ability
to act is governed by the statutes that authorize it to carry out these delegated tasks. Accordingly,
in the course of its work, an agency must interpret these statutory authorizations to determine
what it is required to do and to ascertain the limits of its authority. The scope of agencies’
statutory authority is sometimes tested through litigation. When courts review challenges to
agency actions, they give special consideration to agencies’ interpretations of the statutes they
administer. Judicial review of such interpretations is governed by the two-step framework set
forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
The Chevron framework of review usually applies if Congress has given an agency the general
authority to make rules with the force of law. If Chevron applies, a court asks at step one whether
Congress directly addressed the precise issue before the court, using traditional tools of statutory
construction. If the statute is clear on its face, the court must effectuate Congress’s stated intent.
However, if the court concludes instead that a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the court proceeds to Chevron’s second step. At step two, courts defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Application of the Chevron doctrine in practice has become increasingly complex. Courts and
scholars alike debate which types of agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference,
what interpretive tools courts should use to determine whether a statute is clear or ambiguous, and
how closely courts should scrutinize agency interpretations for reasonableness. A number of
judges and legal commentators have even questioned whether Chevron should be overruled
entirely. Moreover, Chevron is a judicially created doctrine that rests in large part upon a
presumption about legislative intent, and Congress could modify the courts’ use of the doctrine by
displacing this underlying presumption.
This report discusses the Chevron decision, explains the circumstances in which the Chevron
doctrine applies, explores how courts apply the two steps of Chevron, and highlights some
criticisms of the doctrine, with an eye towards the potential future of Chevron deference.