Kosovo: Implications for Military Intelligence (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Nov. 5, 1999 |
| Report Number |
RL30366 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Richard A. Best, Jr., Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aerial operations conducted in April-June 1999
against
Serbian forces and installations (Operation Allied Force) demonstrated that an air campaign largely
based on precision weapons can accomplish major military and political objectives even in the
absence of a ground campaign. Eventual Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo was achieved with
almost no casualties among friendly forces.
The prerequisite to success in NATO's air campaign was highly accurate allied, particularly
U.S., intelligence and precision weapons. The combined use of precise intelligence and munitions
to strike troop positions and stationary targets has been described as a major component of an
ongoing technological revolution that is integral to defense planning in the post-Cold War world.
Far different than the plans for second strike nuclear capabilities and extended deterrence that
characterized earlier U.S. planning, the emphasis on precise targeting that limits friendly and non-
combatant casualties greatly increases the need to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in
something approaching "real-time."
Despite a successful military outcome, however, the Kosovo campaign demonstrates that
neither the Defense Department nor the Intelligence Community is yet fully prepared to provide the
extensive intelligence support required in the military operations envisioned for the next century.
Collection assets were stretched thin; resources had to be borrowed from other theaters. Intelligence
could not in many cases be transmitted immediately to attacking aircraft. Several instances of
erroneous bombing, including the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have been blamed on
faulty intelligence.
It is widely agreed that limitations in U.S. reconnaissance capabilities especially manned
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) must now be addressed. Acquisition of airborne
reconnaissance platforms, as well as satellites, has been complicated by budgetary limitations and,
according to some observers, by administrative shortcomings. Congress has expressed concern
about inadequate progress on UAV programs in particular and some argue that the failure of the
Executive Branch to present comprehensive reconnaissance plans for the entire Defense Department
has forced Congress to make necessary trade-offs. Numerous detailed provisions in FY2000 defense
and intelligence legislation deal with reconnaissance assets. The Conference Report on the FY2000
Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-79 ) indicates that reconnaissance questions will be a matter
of significant concern in consideration of future defense budgets.
Kosovo also demonstrated that other NATO countries are, in large measure, unprepared for the
use of precise intelligence to support precision weaponry, even though such capabilities might cost
less than the large ground force structures currently being maintained. This will present difficult
challenges should the Alliance become involved in further combined operations, but the U.S. has
only a limited ability to achieve the redirection of NATO defense planning.
