South Korea: âSunshine Policyâ and Its Political Context (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
Feb. 12, 2001 |
| Report Number |
RL30188 |
| Report Type |
Report |
| Authors |
Rinn S. Shinn, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Into his third year of rule, President Kim Dae Jung continues to receive high ratings in polls,
except
for his handling of political matters. The political situation is volatile and uncertain, with his ruling
Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) locked in a partisan standoff with the opposition Grand
National Party (GNP) led by Lee Hoi Chang. President Kim also has a tenuous relationship with his
former coalition partner, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD). This fluid situation has complicated
domestic support for the President's "sunshine policy"of engagement with North Korea. U.S.
Policymakers, including many in Congress, have mixed views on the efficacy of the engagement
policy and have a strong interest in South Korean political support for the policy and for President
Kim.
The partisan strife is rooted in regionalism, a defining issue in South Korean politics. From
1961 through 1997, power was associated with the southeastern Kyongsang region; but under
President Kim's stewardship, it shifted to his political stronghold the southwestern Cholla region.
Significantly, this shift also marked the ascendency of a power elite with a liberal political outlook
quite different from that of the conservative establishment associated with the GNP. The opposition,
with its previously dominant parliamentary majority, has tried to regroup to regain its strength. The
ongoing partisan struggle has complicated President Kim's effort to attain bipartisan support on
various issues, including economic reform and policy toward North Korea.
President Kim has tried to engage Pyongyang in a more conciliatory and more consistent
manner than was the case with his predecessors. The June 2000 inter-Korean summit seemed to
vindicate this approach. Since 1998, President Kim has espoused a "comprehensive" approach to
meet Pyongyang's economic, security, and political concerns, with support from the United States
and Japan. In return, Pyongyang is to mend fences with the South and, equally important, to halt its
nuclear and missile programs. This approach is predicated on the provision of incentives to
Pyongyang by Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo; a solid allied united front in policy coordination; and
patience in dealing with Pyongyang's penchant for contentiousness and duplicity. The underlying
rationale is that, in time, North Korea will moderate and play by the rules of the international
community. If the history of negotiations with Pyongyang is any indication, the settlement of inter-
Korean conflict seems certain to be thorny, depending on, among other things, whether the goals and
priorities of the allied engagement policy can be consistent with North Korea's.
