Crime and Forfeiture: The Innocent Third Party (CRS Report for Congress)
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| Release Date |
June 29, 1999 |
| Report Number |
96-869 |
| Authors |
Paul S. Wallace, Jr., American Law Division |
| Source Agency |
Congressional Research Service |
Summary:
Forfeiture has survived through time in American law, and since 1984, the use of forfeiture
statutes
to divest felons of their spoils has increased substantially. The fact that property has been used
illegally does not automatically give the government the right to take and confiscate it. The criminal
behavior must violate a federal statute that specifically authorizes the forfeiture or condemns the
property involved in the offense.
As a result of the increased volume of forfeiture activity, numerous third parties have been
drawn into forfeiture litigation. Coupled with the complexities of forfeiture litigation and the
inconsistencies in the judicial decisions, it has been difficult for the innocent-third-party to justify
his/her rights in seized property.
The judicial analyses of innocent owner defenses in 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(6) and (7) reveal
disparate interpretations. There are two views (disjunctive and conjunctive) as to the correct
interpretation of the statute, and differences exist even within these two views. One school of
thought contends that the term "or" must be read in a disjunctive way, holding that the innocent
owner test requires a claimant to demonstrate either a lack of knowledge or a lack of
consent, but
not a lack of both knowledge and consent ( United States v. Parcel of Real Property
Known as 6109
Grubb Road ). On the other hand, there are some courts which have followed the conjunctive
school
of thought and have held that, in order to maintain the innocent owner defense, a claimant must
establish both lack of knowledge and lack of consent ( United States v. One Parcel of Land,
Known
as Lot 111-B, Tax Map Key 4-4-03-71(4), Waipouli, Kapaa, Island and County of Kauai, State of
Hawaii ). Within the conjunctive view, some courts extend the defense further by stating that
in
order to meet the lack-of-consent test of the innocent-owner defense, the claimant must prove that
he "had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property"
( Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ).
In the cases of Alexander v. United States and Austin v. United States ,
the Supreme Court found
that in some instances, civil proceedings do constitute punishment and may violate the Eighth
Amendment's excessive fines clause. However, the owner's innocence is only one of the factors that
the lower courts have included in their various post-Austin/Alexander tests for
determining whether
a forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine.
